Kierkegaard & Dostoevsky
I’ll be posting quotations from my lecture notes from my course at Princeton on Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky here, in a series of posts, for anyone who may be interested. This will take some time, so check back! This page covers material from my introductory lecture.
Søren Kierkegaard
(1813-1855)
Фёдор Достоевский
(1821-1881)
Overhovedet vilde Poesien, når den bliver opmærksom på det Religieuse og Individualitetens Inderlighed, fåe langt betydningsfuldere Opgaver end de, med hvilke den nu sysler.
Generally, if poetry becomes aware of the religious and of the inwardness of individuality, it will acquire far more meaningful tasks than those with which it busies itself now.
— Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 91 (footnote)
При полном реализме найти в человеке человека... Меня называют психологом: неправда, я лишь реалист в высшем смысле, то есть изображаю все глубины души человеческой.
While maintaining complete realism, to find the man in man... I am called a psychologist, but this is not true; I am merely a realist in a higher sense — that is, I depict all the depths of the human soul.
— Dostoevsky, notebooks
The Form of Truth: Polyphony, Maieutics, Irony and Earnestness
Множественность самостоятельных и неслиянных голосов и сознаний, подлинная полифония полноценных голосов, действительно, является основною особенностью романов Достоевского.
A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels.
— Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 6.
Мир Достоевского глубоко персоналистичен. Всякую мысль он воспринимает и изображает как позицию личности… Мысль, вовлечённая в событие, становится сама событийной и приобретает тот особый характер “идеи-чувства”, “идеи-силы”, который создаёт неповторимое своеобразие “идеи” в творческом мире Достоевского.
Dostoevsky’s world is profoundly personalized. He perceives and represents every thought as the position of a personality… Thought, drawn into an event, becomes itself part of the event and takes on that special quality of an “idea-feeling,” an “idea-force,” which is responsible for the unique peculiarity of the “idea” in Dostoevsky’s creative world
— Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 9-10.
Aвторская активность Достоевского проявляется в доведении каждой из спорящих точек зрения до максимальной силы и глубины, до предела убедительности.
Мы не видим никакой надобности особо говорить о том, что полифонический подход не имеет ничего общего с релятивизмом (как и с догматизмом). Нужно сказать, что и релятивизм и догматизм одинаково исключают всякий спор, всякий подлинный диалог, делая его либо ненужным (релятивизм), либо невозможным (догматизм). Полифония же как художественный метод вообще лежит в другой плоскости.
Dostoevsky’s authorial activity is evident in his extension of every contending point of view to its maximal force and depth, to the outer limits of plausibility.
We see no special need to point out that the polyphonic approach has nothing in common with relativism (or with dogmatism). But it should be noted that both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism). Polyphony as an artistic method lies in an entirely different plane.
— Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 68-69.
Man træffer stundom på Noveller, i hvilke der ved bestemte Personerforedrages modsatte Livs-Anskuelser. Det ender da gjerne med, at den Ene overbeviser den Anden. Istedetfor at Anskuelsen bør tale for sig, beriges Laeseren med det historiske Resultat, at den Anden blev overbevist.
Jeg anseer det for en Lykke, at disse Papirer intet oplyse i denne Henseende.
Når Bogen er læst, da ere A og B glemte, kun Anskuelserne ståe ligeoverfor hinanden og vente ingen endelig Afgjørelse i bestemte Personligheder.
We sometimes come upon novels in which specific characters represent contrasting views of life. They usually end with one persuading the other. The point of view ought to speak for itself, but instead the reader is furnished with the historical result that the other was persuaded.
I consider it fortunate that these papers provide no enlightenment in this respect.
Thus, when the book is read, A and B are forgotten; only the points of view confront each other and expect no final decision in the particular personalities.
— Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part I, 14.
Sandheden er Subjektiviteten.
Det at blive subjektiv er den høieste Opgave, der er sat et Menneske.
Truth is subjectivity.
Becoming subjective is the highest task assigned to a human being.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Irony (Ironi):
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings (his most famous),
signed by:
Viktor Eremita (ed.)
“A”
“B” (Judge William)
Hilarius Bookbinder (publisher)
Frater Taciturnus
Johannes de Silentio
Constantin Constantius
“The Young Man”
Johannes Climacus
Vigilius Haufniensis
Anti-Climacus
Earnestness (Alvor):
writings to which Kierkegaard
signed his own name:
The Journals (spanning his whole adult life)
The Upbuilding Discourses (multiple works)
Works of Love (a single work)
Человек есть тайна. Ее надо разгадать, и ежели будешь разгадывать всю жизнь, то не говори, что потерял время. Я занимаюсь этой тайной, ибо хочу быть человеком.
Man is a mystery (secret, enigma, riddle). This mystery must be understood, and if you spend your entire life trying to do so, you will not have wasted your time. I am occupied with this enigma because I wish to be a human being.
— Dostoevsky, letter to his brother, written at age 18
Det, der egentlig mangler mig, er at komme på det Rene med mig selv om, hvad jeg skal gøre, ikke om, hvad jeg skal erkende, uden for så vidt en Erkendelse må gå forud for enhver Handlen. Det kommer an på at forstå min Bestemmelse, at se, hvad Guddommen egentlig vil, at jeg skal gøre; det gælder om at finde en Sandhed, som er Sandhed for mig, at finde den Ide, for hvilken jeg vil leve og dø.
Og hvad nyttede det mig dertil, om jeg udfandt en såkaldetobjectiv Sandhed; om jeg arbeidede mig igjennem Philosophernes Systemer… Hvad nyttede det mig at kunne udvidkle Christendommens Betydning, at kunne forklare mange enkelte Phaenomener, når den for mig selv og mit Liv ikke havde nogen dybere Betydning? Hvad nyttede det mig, at Sanheden stodder for mig kold og nøgen, ligegyldig ved, om jeg anerkjendte den eller ikke…?
What I really need is to get clear about what I must do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to understand my purpose, to see what it is that God actually wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die.
And what use would it be to me if I discovered a so-called objective truth; if I worked my way through the philosophers’ systems… What use would if be to me to be able to hold forth on the meaning of Christianity, to be able to explain all sorts of particular phenomena, when this has no deeper meaning for myself and my life? What use would it be to me if Truth stood right in front of me, cold and bare, indifferent as to whether I acknowledged it or not…?
— Kierkegaard, Journals Entry entitled “Gilleleie, August 1, 1835,” written while a student, at 22 years of age.
Medens den objektive Tænkning sætter Alt i Resultat, og forhjælper den hele Menneskehed til at snyde ved at afskrive og opramse Resultatet og Facitet, sætter den subjektive Tænkning alt i Vorden, og udelader Resultatet... fordi han som existerende bestandigen er i Vorden, hvilket da ethvert Menneske er, der ikke har ladet sig narre til at blive objektiv, til overmenneskeligt at blive Speculationen.
Forskjelligheden mellem den subjektive og den objektive Tænkningmå også yttre sig i Meddelsens Form.
Whereas objective thinking invests everything in the result and assists all humankind to cheat by copying and reeling off the results and answers, subjective thinking invests everything in the process of becoming and omits the result… because [the subjective thinker], as existing, is continually in the process of becoming, as is every human being who has not permitted himself to be tricked into becoming objective, into inhumanly becoming speculative thought.
This difference between subjective and objective thinking must also manifest itself in the form of communication.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 72.
Et Tilværelsens System kan ikke gives. Altså er et sådant ikke til? Ingenlunde... Tilværelsen selv er et System — for Gud, men kan ikke være det for nogen existerende Ånd.
System og Afsluttethed svare til hinanden, men Tilværelse er netop det Modsatte. Abstract seet lader System og Tilværelse sig ikke tænke sammen, fordi den systematiske Tanke for at tænke Tilværelse må tænke den som ophævet, altså ikke som tilværende.
A system of existence cannot be given. Is there, then, not such a system? That is not at all the case... Existence itself is a system — for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit.
System and conclusiveness correspond to each other, but existence is the very opposite. Abstractly viewed, system and existence cannot be thought conjointly, because in order to think existence, systematic thought must think it as annulled and consequently as not existing.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 118
Каждая мысль героев Достоевского ("человека из подполья", Раскольникова, Ивана и других) с самого начала ощущает себя репликой незавершенного диалога. Такая мысль не стремится к закругленному и завершенному системно-монологическому целому.
Она напряженно живет на границах с чужою мыслью, с чужим сознанием. Она по-особому событийна и неотделима от человека.
Every thought of Dostoevsky’s heroes (the “Underground Man,” Raskolnikov, Ivan Karamazov, and others) senses from the very beginning that is a retort in an unfinalized dialogue. Such thought does not strive toward some rounded-off, finalized, systematically-monologic whole.
It lives in great tension on the borders of another person’s thought, of another person’s consciousness. In its own way, it is involved in the event, and it is inseparable from the human being.
— Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics
Da det strider mod vor Foreningens Bestræbelse at leveresammenhængende Arbeider eller større Heelheder, da vor Tendens ikkeer at arbeide på et babylonisk Tårn, som Gud i sin Retfærdighed kanstige ned og ødelægge... [vi] anerkjender det som det Eiendommeligefor al menneskelig Stræben i sin Sandhed, at den er fragmentarisk, at det netop er det, hvorved den adskiller sig fra Naturens uendeligeSammenhæng; at en Individualitets Rigdom beståer netop i dens Kraft i fragmentarisk Øselhed...
Since it is at variance with the aims of our association to provide coherent works or larger unities, since it is not our intention to labor on a Tower of Babel that God in his righteousness can descend and destroy... [we] acknowledge as characteristic of all human striving in its truth, that it is fragmentary, that it is precisely this which distinguishes it from nature’s infinite coherence, that an individual’s wealth consists specifically in his capacity for fragmentary prodigality...
— Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part I, 151.
In Ulrich war später… daraus eine Vorstellung geworden, die er nun… mit dem eigentümlichen Begriff eines Essays verband.
Ungefähr wie ein Essay in der Folge seiner Abschnitte ein Ding von vielen Seiten nimmt, ohne es ganz zu erfassen, — den ein ganz erfaßtes Ding verliert mit einem Male seinen Umfang und schmilzt zu einem Begriff ein — glaubte er, Welt und eigenes Leben am richtigsten ansehen und behandeln zu können.
Er war kein Philosoph. Philosophen sind Gewalttäter, die keine Armee zur Verfügung haben und sich deshalb die Welt in der Weise unterwerfen, daß sie sie in ein System sperren.
From all this there later arose in Ulrich a notion which he associated with the peculiar concept of an essay.
Roughly speaking, the way in which an essay, in the sequence of its various passages, takes up a thing from many sides, without ever grasping it in its entirety — for a thing entirely grasped immediately loses its dimension and is melted down into a mere concept — seemed to him the most correct way to view and deal with the world and with his own life.
He was no philosopher. Philosophers are workers of violence who have no army at their disposal, and who therefore subjugate the world to themselves by forcing it into a system.
— Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing
(1729-1781)
Kierkegaard presents Lessing as a model of subjective thinking (and writing) in Chapter II of Concluding Unscientific Postscript, entitled: “Possible and Actual Theses by Lessing.”
Den religieuse Subjektivitets Udviklings-Gang har nemlig den maerkelige Egenskab, at Veien bliver til for den Enkelte og lukker sig efter ham.
I religieus Henseende havde had altid Noget for sig selv, Noget, som han vel sagde, men på en underfunding Måde, Noget, som ikke ligefrem lod sig ramse bagefter af Repetenter, Noget, som bestandigen blev det Samme, medens det bestandigen forandrede Form…
Alt Dette er det Alvor?
The course of development of the religious subject has the peculiar quality that the pathway comes in existence for the single individual and closes up behind him.
With regard to the religious, [Lessing] always kept something to himself, something that he certainly did say but in a crafty way, something that could not be reeled off by tutors, something that continually remained the same while it continuously changed form…
All of this, is it earnestness?
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 67-70.
Om jeg med Djaevels Vold og Magt vilde vaere Lessings Discipel, jeg kan det ikke, han har forhindret det. Som han selv er fri, så vilhan frigjøre Enhver, det taenker jeg, I sit Forhold til ham…
If I wanted to be Lessing’s follower by hook or by crook, I could not; he has prevented it. Just as he himself is free, so, I think, he wants to make everyone free in relation to him…
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 72.
Den subjektive religieuse Taenker... indseer let, at den ligefremme Meddelelse er et Bedrag mod Gud (der bedrager ham muligen for et andet Menneskes Tilbedelse in Sandhed), et Bedrag mod sig selv(som var han ophørt at vaere existerende), et Bedrag mod et andet Menneske (som muligen kun får et relativt Gudsforhold), et Bedrag, der bringer ham i Modsigelse med hele hans Taenkning.
Therefore, the subjective religious thinker... readily perceives that direct communication is a fraud toward God (which possibly defrauds him of the worship of another person in truth), a fraud toward himself (as if he had ceased to be an existing person), a fraud toward another human being (who possibly attains only a relative God-relationship), a fraud that brings him into contradiction with his entire thought.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 75.
Saet altså, at En vilde meddele følgende Overbevisning: Sandheden er Inderligheden; der er objektivt ingen Sandhed; men Tilegnelsen er Sandheden...
Saet han så sagde det ved alle Leiligheder og bevaegede ikke blot de Letsvedende, men også hårdføre Mennesker: hvad så?
En Udråber af Inderlighed er et seevaerdigt Dyr.
Suppose, then, that someone wanted to communicate the following conviction: truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth...
Suppose he said it on every occasion and moved not only those who sweat easily but even the tough people — what then?
[The result would be “followers” and “barkers”]
A barker of inwardness is a creature worth seeing.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 77.
Saet En vilde meddele, at ikke Sandheden er Sandheden, men Veien er Sandhed, det vil sige, at Sandheden kun er i Vordelsen, iTilegnelsens Proces, at der altså ingen Resultat er...
Saet En vilde meddele den Overbevisning, at et Menneskes Guds-Forhold er en Hemmelighed...
Først den subjektive Taenkning har Hemmeligheder, det vil sige: al dens vaesentlige Indhold er vaesentlig Hemmelighed, fordi det ikkeligefrem lader sig meddele.
Suppose someone wanted to communicate that the truth is not the truth but that the way is the truth, that is, that the truth is only in the becoming, in the process of appropriation, that consequently there is no result...
Suppose someone wanted to communicate the conviction that a person’s God-relationship is a secret.
Only subjective thinking has secrets; that is, all its essential content is essentially a secret, because it cannot be communicated directly.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 78-9.
Socrates
(470-399 BC)
Christ
Pantokrator
Χριστὸς
Παντοκράτωρ
(6th century icon)
Socrates and Christ are the two most important figures in Kierkegaard’s work; while these two great teachers share a concern with awakening subjectivity in the learner, Kierkegaard develops at length (in Philosophical Fragments) the difference between what it means to be taught by a man (Socrates) and taught by God (Christ, God incarnate).
Medens alle de rare Mennesker uden videre ere fix og færdige til at tage sig af Verdenshistoriens Fremtid, må jeg mangen Gang sidde hjemme og sørge over mig selv.
Det Eneste, der trøster mig, er Socrates.
While all the good people are promptly all set to attend to the future of world history, I am obliged many a time to sit at home and mourn over myself.
The only one who consoles me is Socrates.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 161
Σωκράτης
ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι᾽ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰτοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶνἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία
Socrates:
The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom.
— Plato, The Apology
οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼσοφώτερός εἰμι: κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲνκαλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκεἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι:
τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐντῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός... οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.
Socrates, upon examining a supposedly wise man:
I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either.
The fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: “Human wisdom is of little or no value... This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognizes that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom.
— Plato, The Apology
Σωκράτης
τῇ δέ γ᾽ ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰσώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶτόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις: ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας... μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν.
Socrates:
All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practiced upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labor, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom...The god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to give birth.
— Plato, Theaetetus (340)
Socrates [var] en Dagdriver, der hverken brød sig om Verdenshistorien eller Astronomien...
Men [han] havde god Tid og Særhed nok til at bekymre sig om det simple Menneskelige, hvilken Bekymring, besynderligt nok, anseesfor Særhed hos Mennesker, medens det derimod slet ikke er sært, at have travlt med Verdenshistorien, Astronomien og andet Sådant.
Ifølge en udmærket Afhandling... seer jeg at Socrates skal have været noget ironisk...
Socrates was a loafer who cared for neither world history nor astronomy...
But he had plenty of time and enough eccentricity to be concerned about the merely human, a concern that, strangely enough, is considered an eccentricity among human beings, whereas it is not at all eccentric to be busy with world history, astronomy, and other such matters.
In a superb article... I see that Socrates is supposed to have been somewhat ironic...
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 83
The following was signed not by Kierkegaard, but by a pseudonym, Johannes Climacus; still, many regard it as autobiographical to some extent…
Det er vel nu en fire År siden, at jeg fik den Indfald at ville forsøge mig somForfatter... Det var en Søndag...
Jeg sad som sædvanlig ude hos Conditoren i Frederiskberg Have... Jeg havde en halv Snees År været Student; skjøndt aldrig doven, var dog al min Virksomhed kun som en glimrende Uvirksomhed, en Art Forhold til hvilkenjeg endnu har en stor Forkjerlighed, og i Forhold til hvilken jeg måskeeendog hard lidt Genialitet. Jeg læste Meget, tilbragte det Øvrige af Dagen med at drive og tænke, eller med at tænke og at drive, men derved blev det også.
Så sad jeg da der og røg min Cigar, indtil jeg henfaldt i Tanker. Blandt andreerindrer jeg disse: Du gåer nu, sagde jeg til meg selv, og bliver et gammelt Menneske, uden at være Noget og uden egentligen at foretage Dig Noget.
Overalt derimod hvor Du seer Dig om i Literaturen eller i Livet, seer Du... de mange Tidens Velgjørere, der vide at gavne Menneskeheden ved at gjøreLivet lettere og lettere, Nogle ved Jernbaner, Andre ved Omnibusser og Dampskibe, Andre ved Telegrapheringer, Andre ved letfattelige Oversigterog korte Meddelser af alt Videværdigt, og endligen de sande Tidens Velgjørere, ved at gjøre Ånds-Existensen i Kraft af Tanke systematisk lettereog lettere og dog betydningsfuldere og betydnigsfullere: hvad gjør Du?
Du må gjøre Noget, men da det for Dine indskrænkede Evner vil væreumuligt at gjøre Noget lettere end det er blevet, så må Du med samme menneskekjærlige Begeistring som de Andre påtage Dig at gjøre Nogetsværere.
[Jeg] fattede da det som min Opgave: overalt at gjøre Vanskeligheder.
It is about now about four years since the idea came to me of wanting to try my hand as an author. It was on a Sunday...
As usual, I was sitting outside the café in Frederiksberg Gardens... I had been a student for a half score of years. Although I was never lazy, all my activity was nevertheless only like a splendid inactivity, a kind of occupation I still much prefer and for which I perhaps have a little genius. I read a great deal, spent the rest of the day loafing and thinking, or thinking and loafing, but nothing ever came of it.
So there I sat and smoked my cigar until I drifted into thought. Among other thoughts, I recall these. You are getting on in years, I said to myself, and are becoming an old man without being anything and without actually undertaking anything.
On the other hand, wherever you look in literature or in life, you see... the many benefactors of the age who know how to benefit humankind by making life easier and easier, some by railroads, others by omnibuses and steamships, others by telegraph, others by easily understood surveys and brief publications about everything worth knowing, and finally the true benefactors of the age who by virtue of thought systematically make spiritual existence easier and easier and yet more and more meaningful — and what are you doing?
You must do something, but since with your limited capabilities it will be impossible to make anything easier than it has become, you must, with the same humanitarian enthusiasm as the others have, take it upon yourself to make something more difficult.
I comprehended that it was my task: to make difficulties everywhere.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 185-187
Dostoevsky Station in Moscow, near the hospital for the poor where his father worked.
2. The Nature of Truth: Truth and Subjectivity
compare, in Theology:
Hegel
Objective, positive thought
cataphatic theology
Socrates
Subjective, negative thought
apophatic theology
“Objectivity” is a sham certainty; the only certainty available to human beings is subjectivity.
We are doomed to (blessed with) subjectivity and actuality, but willingly duped out of it by “objectivity.”
To relinquish subjectivity (personhood, freedom, love) is to relinquish one’s humanity.
“Objective” truth, insofar as it is “certain,” is coercive and indifferent; meanwhile, it is quantitative, approximative, and ultimately doomed to skepticism.
Subjective truth is won in freedom, by faith, through a leap. It is freely chosen, appropriated, lived.
λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Πιλᾶτος· Τί ἐστιν ἀλήθεια;
Pilate said to Him, “What is truth?”
— John 18:38
Ἰδοὺ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
“Behold the man.”
— John 19:5
Painting: “What is truth?” Christ and Pilate
„Что есть истина?“ Христос и Пилат
by Nikolai Ge (1890)
Для Достоевского, не существует идей, мысли, положения, которые были бы ничьими — были бы “в себе”. И “истину в себе” он представляет в духе христианской идеологии, как воплощённую в Христе, т.е. представляет её как личность, вступающую во взаимоотношения с другими личностями.
For Dostoevsky, there are no ideas, no thoughts, no positions which belong to no one, which exist “in themselves.” Even “truth in itself” he presents in the spirit of Christian ideology, as incarnated in Christ; that is, he presents it as a personality entering intorelationships with other personalities.
— Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 31-32.
Pilatus gjør Christus dette Spørgsmaal, hvad er Sandhed; men Christus var jo Sandheden, altsaa er Spørgsmaalet ganske paa sit rette Sted. Ja; og dog i en anden Forstand nei. At Pilatus kan faldepaa i det Øieblik at spørge Christus saaledes, beviser netop, at hanaldeles intet Øie har for Sandheden.
Christi Liv var nemlig Sandheden; og derfor siger Christus selv: : jeger dertil fød og dertil kommet til Verden, at jeg skal vidne om Sandhed. Christi Liv paa Jorden, hvert Øieblik i dette Liv var Sandheden.
Pilate asks Christ the question: What is truth? But Christ was indeed the truth; therefore the question was entirely appropriate. Yes, and yet in another sense, no. That it can occur to Pilate at that moment to question Christ in this way demonstrates precisely that he has no eye at all for truth.
Christ's life was in fact the truth, and therefore Christ himself says : For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, that I shall witness to the truth. Christ's life upon earth, every moment of this life, was truth.
— Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 203
Christi Liv paa Jorden, hvert Øieblik i dette Liv var Sandheden; hvoriligger nu Grund-Forvirringen i Pilati Spørgsmaal? Den ligger i, at han kan falde paa saaledes at spørge Christus; thi idet han spørgerChristus saaledes, angiver han jo sig selv, gjør han det aabenbartom sig selv, at Christi Liv har ikke forklaret ham hvad Sandhed er – men hvor skulde Christus saa med Ord kunne oplyse Pilatus derom, naar det som er Sandheden, Christi Liv, ikke har aabnetPilati Øine for hvad Sandhed er!
What, then, is the fundamental confusion in Pilate's question? It consists in this, that it can occur to him to question Christ in this way; for in questioning Christ in this way he actually informs against himself, he makes the self-disclosure that Christ's life has not explained to him what truth is — but how then could Christ with words enlighten Pilate about this when that which is truth, Christ's life, has not opened Pilate's eyes to what truth is!
— Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 203
Intet Menneske, Christus undtagen, er Sandheden...
Christus er Sandheden; »kan mit Liv« maatte han sige »ikke aabneDine Øine for hvad Sandhed er, saa er det af Alle mig umuligst at sige Dig det. Deri er min Forskjel fra alle andre Mennesker; det er vistnok aldrig ganske sandt hvad noget andet Menneskeforklarer til Svar paa det Spørgsmaal, hvad er Sandhed; men jeg er det eneste Menneske, som ikke kan svare paa detteSpørgsmaal, thi jeg er Sandhed.«
No human being, with the exception of Christ, is the truth...
Christ is the truth. "If my life," he might say, "cannot open your eyes to what truth is, then to tell it to you is for me the most impossible of all. In that respect, I am different from all other human beings. What any other person may answer to the question 'What is truth?’ is indeed never entirely true, but I am the only human being whocannot reply to this question, for I am truth."
— Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 204-5
Altsaa i den Forstand er Christus Sandheden, at det at være Sandhe202den er den eneste sande Forklaring af hvad Sandhed er. Mankan derfor spørge en Apostel, man kan spørge en Christen, hvad er Sandhed, og saa viser Apostelen og denne Christen til Svar paaSpørgsmaalet hen paa Christus og siger: see paa ham, lær afham, han var Sandheden. Dette vil sige, Sandheden i den Forstand, hvori Christus er Sandheden, er ikke en Sum afSætninger, ikke en Begrebsbestemmelse o. D., men et Liv.
Thus Christ is the truth in the sense that to be the truth is the only true explanation of what truth is. Therefore one can ask an apostle, one can ask a Christian, "What is truth?" and in answer to the question the apostle and this Christian will point to Christ and say: Look at him, learn from him, he was the truth. This means that truth in the sense in which Christ is the truth is not a sum of statements, not a definition etc., but a life.
— Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 204-5
Det Positive i Forhold til Tænkning lader sig henføre til disseBestemmelser: sanselig Vished, historisk Viden, speculativtResultat. Men dette Positive er netop det Usande. Den sandseligeVished er Svig (cfr. den græske Skepsis...); den historiske Viden er Sandsebedrag (da den er Approximations-Viden); og det speculative Resultat er Blendværk.
Alt dette Positive udtrykker nemlig ikke det erkjendende SubjektsTilstand i Existentsen, det angåer derfor en fingeret objektivtSubjekt, og at forvexle sig selv med et sådant er at blive og at værenarret.
In the domain of thinking, the positive can be classed in the following categories: sensate certainty, historical knowledge, speculative result. But this positive is precisely the untrue. Sensate certainty is a delusion (see Greek skepticism...); historical knowledge is an illusion (since it is approximation-knowledge); and the speculative result is a phantom.
That is, all of this positive fails to express the state of the knowing subject in existence; hence it pertains to a fictive objective subject, and to mistake oneself for such a subject is to be fooled and to remain fooled.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 81.
Ethvert Subjekt er et existerende Subjekt, og derfor må dettevæsentligen udtrykke sig i al hans Erkjenden og udtrykke sig somforhindrende den i illusorisk Afslutning i Sanse-Vished, i historiskViden, i illusorisk Resultat...
Med sin formeentlige Positivitat bilder [han] sig ind at have Visheden, som dog kun kaves i Uendeligheden, i hvilken han dog som existerende ikke kan være, men bestandigt ankomme.
Every subject is an existing subject, and therefore this must be essentially expressed in all of his knowing and must be expressed by keeping his knowing from an illusory termination in sensate certainty, in historical knowledge, in illusory results...
With his presumed positivity he fancies himself to have a certainty that can be had only in infinitude, in which, however, he cannot be as an existing person but at which he is continually arriving.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 81.
De Negative have derfor bestandigt den Fordeel, at de have nogetPositivt, dette nemlig, at de ere opmærksomme på det Negative, de Positive have slet Intet, thi de ere bedragne.
Netop fordi det Negative er tilstede i Tilværelsen og er overalttilstede (thi Tilværelse, Existence er bestandig i Vorden), derforgjelder det som den eneste Frelse derimod at blive bestandigtopmærksom derpå. Ved at blive positivt betrygget er Subjektetnetop narret.
The negative thinkers therefore always have the advantage that they have something positive, namely this, that they are aware of the negative; the positive thinkers have nothing whatever, for they are deluded.
Precisely because the negative is present in existence and present everywhere (because being there, existence, is continually in the process of becoming), the only deliverance from it is to become continually aware of it. By being positively secured, the subject is indeed fooled.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 81.
Den Negativitet der er i Tilværelsen, eller rettere det existerendeSubjekts Negativitet (hvilken hans Tænkning må væsentligen gjengive ien adæqvat Form), er grundet i Subjektets Synthese, at det er enexisterende uendelig Ånd. Uendeligheden og det Evige er det enesteVisse, men idet det er i Subjektet, er det i Tilværelsen, og det førsteUdtryk derfor er dets Svig og denne uhyre Modsigelse, at det Evigevorder, at det bliver til.
Det existerende Subjekt er evigt, men som existerende er det timeligt. Uendelighedens Svig er nu, at Dødens Mulighed at tilstede i ethvertØieblik. Al posiitv Tilforladelighed er således gjort mistænkt.
The negativity that is in existence, or rather the negativity of the existing subject (which his thinking must render essentially in an adequate form), is grounded in the subject’s synthesis, in his being an existing infinite spirit. The infinite and the eternal are the only certainty, but since it is in the subject, it is in existence, and the first expression for it is its illusiveness and the prodigious contradiction that the eternal becomes, that it comes into existence.
The existing subject is eternal, but as existing he is temporal. Now, the illusiveness of the infinite is that the possibility of death is present at every moment. All positive dependability is thus made suspect
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 82.
Men den egentlig subjektive existerende Tænker han er bestandig ligesånegativ som positiv, og omvendt... Hans Meddelelse er svarendedertil, at han ikke ved at være så overordentlig meddeelsom meningsløstskal forvandle en Lærendes Existens til noget Andet end hvad enmenneskelig Existens overhovedet er. Han er vidende om det UendligesNegativitat i Tilværelsen, han holder bestandigt dette NegativitetensSår åbent, hvilket jo stundom er det Frelsende (de Andre lade Såret groe tilog blive Positive — Begragne).
På den Måde gåer jo rigtignok en sådan subjektiv Tænker glip af Noget, hanfåer ikke den positive trivelige Glæde af Livet.
But the genuine subjective existing thinker is always just as negative as he is positive and vice versa: he is always that as long as he exists... His communication corresponds to this, lest by being overly communicative he meaninglessly transform a learner’s existence into something other than what human existence is on the whole. He is cognizant of the negativity of the infinite in existence; he always keeps open the wound of negativity, which at times is a saving factor (the others let the wound close and become positive — deceived).
In this way, such a subjective thinker does indeed miss something; he does not derive positive, cozy joy from life.
— Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 85.
Gud hadde stukket sin finger ned i mit nervenett og lempelig, ganske løselig brakt litt uorden i trådene. Og Gud hadde trukket sin finger tilbake og se, det var trevler og fine rottråder på fingeren av mine nervers tråder. Og det var et åpent hull efter hans finger som var Guds finger, og sår i min hjerne efter hans fingers veier. Men der Gud hadde berørt meg med sin hands finger lot han meg være og berørte meg ikke mere og lot meg intet ondt vederfares. Men han lot meg gå med fred og han lot meg gå med det åpnehull. Og intet ondt vederfores meg av Gud som er Herren in all evighet…
God had poked his finger into the net of my nerves and casually, rather loosely, brought the threads into a slight disorder. And God had withdrawn his finger, and behold: there were fibers and fine threads of roots on his finger, from the threads of my nerves. And there was an open hole left by his finger, which was God's finger, and a wound left in my brain wherever his finger had been. But when God had touched me with the finger of his hand, he left me alone and touched me no more and let no evil befall me. But he let me go in peace, and he let me go with the open hole. And no evil is done to me by God who is the Lord for all eternity...
— Knut Hamsun, Hunger
